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CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: A NEW ERA FOR PROTECTING
DATA GENERATED ON PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY, OR A MERE
CAVEAT?
Aaron L. Dalton*
In deciding Carpenter, a majority of United States Supreme Court
Justices recognized that, at a fundamental level, historical cell-site
location information (CSLI) differs from other categories of
business records in terms of deserving Fourth Amendment
protection. However, the majority’s opinion is unclear about the
precise source of this distinction, and about how, or whether, to
protect other data generated from personal technology in the future.
Although the majority opinion purports to be limited to CSLI, this
narrow scope is not in the best interest of consumers. At best,
Carpenter presents the opportunity to establish a predictable and
comprehensive system for protecting personal data from
warrantless search. However, the majority’s approach also risks
becoming a mere caveat, drawing artificial distinctions between
CSLI and other types of data that may be equally, or more, sensitive.
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized some forms of data held
by businesses are protected from warrantless search, this holding
should be expanded to protect the increasingly comprehensive
consumer data that companies acquire. Although Justice Kennedy’s
dissent in Carpenter highlighted the risks of the majority’s
unstructured approach, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United
States v. Jones provided an aspirational glimpse of how personal
data could be protected in the future. Courts should read Carpenter
in conjunction with Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to
provide a predictable standard for evaluating personal data
protections and avoid the uncertain approach that the Carpenter
majority’s opinion risks establishing.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
What protections do consumers operating cell phones or other
personal devices that generate comprehensive data on users have
from that data being obtained without a warrant and used in a
criminal prosecution against them? For years, the answer has been
“little or none,” an alarming state of affairs in a data-driven society.1

1

See Daniel Zwerdling, Your Home is Your . . . Snitch? When Your Appliances
Work as Police Informants, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 24, 2018),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/24/your-home-is-your-snitch

DEC. 2018]

Carpenter v. United States: A New Era?

3

Law enforcement may access consumer data without a warrant due
to the third-party doctrine, which holds that consumers lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal data contained in
business records, since this information has been disclosed to, and
is held by, third parties.2 With the explosion of personal technology,3
scholars have questioned the validity of the third-party doctrine, as
business records now consist of highly detailed information about
consumers, who may not be aware of the scope of information
collected and stored by companies through consumer use of
ubiquitous devices.4
(describing law enforcement’s ability to use data obtained from “smart”
appliances in criminal investigations).
2
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (“[W]e perceive no
legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in their [banking record’s] contents . . . . This
Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed.”) (citations omitted).
3
This Recent Development uses the term “personal technology” as a shorthand
for the wide array of consumer electronic devices that send or receive signals and
the programs on these devices, such as internet browsers and applications. Rather
than provide an exhaustive list of connected consumer devices, the services that
power them, and the applications they contain, the term “personal technology” is
intended to encompass both older technologies (such as cell phones and
computers), newer technologies (such as Internet of Things devices), and future
connected consumer technologies, along with data-generating programs on these
devices. For a discussion of Internet of Things devices, see Adam D. Thierer, The
Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security
Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 6, 2015, at 1,
4–17; see also Ian Bogost, Amazon Is Invading Your Home with MicroConvenience,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/amazon-is-invadingyour-home-with-micro-convenience/571015/ (discussing Amazon’s developing
line of Alexa-compatible smart home appliances).
4
See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet
Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
54 (2016) (“New technologies challenge many of the basic assumptions
underlying such principles as the third-party doctrine. Specifically, there may be
no way for a user to know or even discover what kind of information she shares
with third parties, many of whom are invisible to her. Similarly, traditional models
of what constitutes content and what might be considered mere transactional, non-
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In Carpenter v. United States,5 the United States Supreme Court
issued a landmark decision for technology and privacy, as the Court
reconsidered the third-party doctrine in light of technological
developments.6 The technology at issue in Carpenter was cell-site
location information (CSLI), a form of data generated by cell phones
and held by telecommunications companies.7 When a cell phone
connects to a cell tower, the connection is time-stamped and
recorded, creating a detailed record of the cell phone user’s
movements.8 Given the increased capabilities of cell phones, and the
expanded networks of cell towers used to power them, CSLI
provides detailed, location-based information on any consumer
carrying a cell phone.9 Any cell phone generates CSLI when it
receives or sends a call or text message,10 and smartphones generate
CSLI “several times a minute whenever their signal is on,”11 even
when the consumer is not actively using the smartphone.12
Although the majority opinion discussed both the
conceptualization of reasonable expectations of privacy in the

content information often yield nonsensical, indeterminate, or unsatisfying results
when applied to modern technologies.”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580–81 (2009) (“Just as the Fourth
Amendment should protect that which technology exposes, so should the Fourth
Amendment permit access to that which technology hides. From this perspective,
the third-party doctrine is needed to ensure the technology neutrality of the Fourth
Amendment. It ensures that we have the same rough degree of Fourth Amendment
protection independently of whether wrongdoers use third-party agents to
facilitate their crimes.”).
5
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
6
Id. at 2214–15 (“This sort of digital data—personal location information
maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents.
Instead, requests for cell-site records lie at the intersection of two lines of cases,
both of which inform our understanding of the privacy interests at stake.”).
7
See id. at 2211–12 (discussing the technology behind CSLI).
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
Robert M. Bloom & William T. Clark, Small Cells, Big Problems: The
Increasing Precision of Cell Site Location Information and the Need for Fourth
Amendment Protections, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 172–73 (2016).
11
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
12
See id. at 2211–12.
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digital age13 and the limitations of the third-party doctrine,14 this
Recent Development focuses primarily on the third-party doctrine
aspects of the majority’s opinion. The majority’s decision to limit
the third-party doctrine by protecting CSLI from warrantless
searches15 could drastically alter the future of consumer data
privacy. By reading Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in United States v. Jones,16 courts in future cases should
find that other forms of aggregated data generated by personal
technology and held by third party companies are similarly
protected from warrantless searches. Alternatively, the majority’s
opinion could be construed narrowly,17 representing a missed
opportunity for enhanced protection of sensitive aggregated
consumer data in the digital age.
After providing a brief overview of how CSLI technology
records consumer data and discussing newer technology that
presents additional problems in Section II, this Recent Development
reviews the major cases leading up to Carpenter in Section III, and
provides an analysis of the Carpenter majority holding and Justice
Kennedy’s dissent in Section IV. Finally, this Recent Development
recommends in Section V that courts read Carpenter alongside
Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to establish a framework for
greater Fourth Amendment protection of consumer data held by
third-party businesses before contrasting this approach with one
based on reading Carpenter alone.
II. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND
Although the widespread use of cell phones makes CSLI
especially concerning,18 other forms of consumer data held by third
parties may be equally, or more, sensitive. Comparing CSLI with
other forms of aggregated consumer data generated on personal
13

See id. at 2215.
See id. at 2216.
15
See id. at 2223.
16
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
17
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We
do not express a view on matters not before us.”).
18
See id. at 2211 (noting that while the United States has a population of 326
million, the nation is home to 396 million cellular service accounts).
14
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technology reveals that CSLI is merely one example out of the
myriad forms of sensitive consumer data held by businesses.
Internet of Things (IoT) or “smart” devices, defined as objects with
networked sensors that can communicate amongst themselves,
present unprecedented opportunities for mass data collection from
everyday objects.19 Although the Court’s decision to protect CSLI
from warrantless searches represents a positive first step for
consumer privacy protection, aggregated consumer data generated
through other personal technologies is equally deserving of Fourth
Amendment protection.
A. What is CSLI and How Does It Work?
Cellular networks are supported by cell towers, which are
arranged in a hexagonal pattern typically featuring three antennas
that provide cell coverage to a circular area surrounding the tower. 20
When a cell phone connects to a tower, the consumer’s telephone
number and the product number of the consumer’s cell phone are
recorded along with the time; CSLI describes this set of data.21
Although a traditional cell tower in an urban area provides coverage
within a radius ranging from half a mile to two miles surrounding
the tower, the precise antenna that provides the connection is
recorded.22 Thereby, the consumer’s location is traceable to one
specific wedge within the cell tower’s coverage area.23 Depending
on the size of the cell tower’s radius and the number of antennas,
this places the user in an area ranging from one-eighth to four square
miles.24 Because smartphones rely on internet connections to power
a host of applications, even when not in active use,25 “[v]irtually any
19

See Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., After the Gold Rush: The Boom of the Internet
of Things, and the Busts of Data-Security and Privacy, 28 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 75–78 (2017) (describing IoT devices, such as
driverless cars, “smart” pill bottles, and wearable devices, while warning that
these technologies gather and analyze vast quantities of consumer data, often with
few security protections designed to thwart hackers).
20
See Bloom & Clark, supra note 10, at 172.
21
See id. at 172–73.
22
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
23
Id. at 2218 (majority opinion).
24
See id.
25
Id. at 2211–12.

DEC. 2018]

Carpenter v. United States: A New Era?

7

activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls,
texts, or e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone
automatically makes when checking for news, weather, or social
media updates.”26
The telecommunications company that owns the cell tower
stores the CSLI data for up to five years,27 and frequently sells
aggregated CSLI data to third-parties as part of a market worth
billions of dollars.28 To illustrate this point, major cell service
providers have contracts with data aggregators that can allow
consumers to receive virtual coupons from nearby businesses or
receive roadside assistance.29 In addition to marketing ploys, these
contracts allow data aggregators to market real-time CSLI tracking
services to law enforcement agencies.30
The Carpenter case illustrates one of the problems with taking a
haphazard approach to developing technologies: by the time a case
reaches the Supreme Court, the underlying technology has been
refined to the point of presenting different questions than the
technology at issue in the case.31 The CSLI data used to convict

26

Id. at 2220.
See id. at 2218.
28
See id. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“This data can be used, for example,
to help a department store determine which of various prospective store locations
is likely to get more foot traffic from middle-aged women who live in affluent zip
codes.”).
29
See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Service Meant to Monitor Inmates’ Calls
Could
Track
You,
Too,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/technology/cellphone-tracking-lawenforcement.html?module=inline.
30
See id. (describing Securus Technologies, a data broker that used a location
aggregator stocked with CSLI records from AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and
Verizon to sell real-time tracking services to law enforcement); see also Jennifer
Valentino-DeVries, Largest Cell Phone Carriers to Limit Sales of Location Data,
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/
technology/verizon-att-cellphone-tracking.html (describing promises by major
cell service providers to reform CSLI marketing practices in response to public
outcry regarding location aggregators).
31
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (“While the records in this case reflect the
state of technology at the start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly
approaching GPS-level precision.”).
27
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Carpenter was generated in 2011,32 and cell tower technology has
developed significantly since then.33 As the majority in Carpenter
noted: “[w]hile the records in this case reflect the state of technology
at the start of the decade, the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly
approaching GPS-level precision . . . wireless carriers have the
capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50 meters.”34 This
increased precision is due primarily to the use of “small cell”
technology, which refers to a variety of small-scale cell tower
locations that supplement networks of traditional cell towers.35
Small cells can be installed in homes with poor coverage, in public
spaces that have high demand for coverage in a relatively compact
area (such as stadiums), or on lampposts in densely-populated urban
areas.36
Given the enthusiasm with which urban areas have been
installing, or developing plans to install, small-cell technologies,37
some estimates state that CSLI generated from a small-cell location
could accurately record consumer location to within ten feet. 38 This
ten-foot area is significantly more alarming than the one-eighth of a
mile to four square mile area generated by traditional cell towers,
and represents location-tracking capabilities that can match or
surpass those of GPS devices.39 This demonstrates the inherent
problems with an unstructured approach to protecting data generated
by new technology: without a predictable framework, the

32

See id. at 2212.
See id.
34
Id.
35
Bloom & Clark, supra note 10, at 174 (“Small cells are miniature base
stations that provide a small range of cellular signal in areas that are either
overburdened or underserved by traditional cell networks.”).
36
Id. at 174–75.
37
See Allan Holmes, 5G Cell Service Is Coming. Who Decides Where It Goes?,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/technology/
5g-cellular-service.html (describing plans to place small-cells 500 feet apart in
urban areas in order to facilitate 5G network coverage).
38
Bloom & Clark, supra note 10, at 176.
39
Id. (explaining that although GPS technology can track location to within
fifty feet, small-cell systems could lead to CSLI that is accurate to within ten feet
or less).
33
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technology at issue in the case becomes outdated, perhaps even
obsolete, before the case reaches the Supreme Court.
B. New Technologies Present New Challenges for Privacy
Protection
Although CSLI is an undoubtedly powerful type of data that
deserves protection from warrantless search, it is merely one form
of data generated on personal technology that presents challenges to
traditional applications of the third-party doctrine. Indeed, given the
ever-increasing capabilities of smartphones, CSLI may not even be
the most sensitive data collected from cellular devices.40 The host of
“sensors, accelerometers, cameras, microphones, and other
capabilities that can be used to collect and transmit various types of
user information”41 that come standard on modern smartphones
means that CSLI is merely one of many types of sensitive data
generated from smartphones.42 Additionally, the capability of
smartphones to connect with “smart” devices threatens to expose
ever-increasing aspects of everyday life to collection by third-party
businesses, and, thus, law enforcement.43
Internet of Things (IoT), or “smart” devices, can be broadly
defined as objects with sensors that communicate amongst
themselves via the internet.44 These devices rely on embedded
computer chips to generate data, which is then shared with other
“smart” devices by using Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cell phone networks, or
other means of connection to access the internet.45 By connecting to
a plethora of everyday objects, IoT devices have the potential to
create “an almost inescapable data web that monitors many aspects
of one’s life.”46 For example, smart utility meters can monitor water
40

See Thierer, supra note 3, at 21.
Id.
42
See id.
43
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2016) (“Today, with the advent
of the ‘Internet of Things,’ objects in your house, car, office, and smartphone
communicate, interact, report, track, and provide vast amounts of data about the
activities of their owners.”).
44
See Posadas, supra note 19, at 75.
45
See id. at 76–77.
46
Ferguson, supra note 43, at 819.
41
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or electricity usage by the hour and compare that usage with past
trends.47 One utility company reported receiving subpoenas from
law enforcement for the smart meter data of 480 customers in
2017.48 Smart refrigerators can track food consumption, reordering
items as they are used, while smart mattresses can monitor sleep
patterns.49 Amazon has recently unveiled a line of everyday devices,
including analog wall clocks and microwaves, that are responsive to
voice commands through Alexa, the company’s virtual voice
assistant.50 Additionally, the insurance company, John Hancock, has
announced plans to encourage life-insurance policyholders to wear
fitness tracking devices in exchange for policy discounts.51
The rapid expansion of connected IoT devices52 highlights the
importance of establishing a predictable framework for protecting
data held by third-parties from warrantless search, as data generated
by IoT devices could dwarf that generated by CSLI.53 Rather than
leaving lower courts without guidance regarding how to evaluate
each individual IoT device, the Supreme Court should adopt a
comprehensive interpretive stance that provides predictable
protection for data generated by these technologies.
47

See Zwerdling, supra note 1.
See id.
49
See id.
50
See Bogost, supra note 3.
51
See id.; see also Angela Chen, What Happens When Life Insurance
Companies Track Fitness Data?, THE VERGE (Sept. 26, 2018, 1:01 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/26/17905390/john-hancock-life-insurancefitness-tracker-wearables-science-health.
52
See Thierer, supra note 3, at 12 (citing estimates that approximately 30 billion
IoT devices will be in use by 2020); see also Peter Newman, There Will be More
Than 55 Billion IoT Devices by 2025 — These Are the Biggest Drivers for
Adoption, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/
internet-of-things-report (estimating that 55 billion IoT devices will be in use by
2025, up from 9 billion in 2017).
53
See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 820 (“Knowing that you called a certain
number (cell data), drove to a certain house (drone or camera), and repeated that
trip every week (GPS) pales in comparison to knowing those facts plus the time
the bedroom light comes on in that house (through NEST systems), the elevated
heartbeat in that bedroom (through health monitors), and the opening of a
particular enchanted pill bottle (smart pill bottles)—all of which might provide a
much better clue about the nature of your business at the house.”).
48
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III. BACKGROUND LAW: WHERE DATA PROTECTION HAS BEEN
AND WHERE IT IS GOING
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States54
established the “reasonable expectations of privacy” test for
determining if law enforcement conducted a search that required a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment.55 However, the Supreme
Court later revised this test to exclude business records from Fourth
Amendment protection in United States v. Miller,56 which
established the third-party doctrine as a limitation on Katz.57 Smith
v. Maryland58 then applied the third-party doctrine to data generated
by pen registers, which record dialed telephone numbers.59 More
recently, a majority of Supreme Court Justices in United States v.
Jones60 recognized that individuals may have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in their aggregated movements, but deferred
answering this question.61 In her Jones concurrence, meanwhile,
Justice Sotomayor recommended granting Fourth Amendment
protection to aggregated movements and questioned the continued
appropriateness of the third-party doctrine.62 The specific facts of
each case provide clues both to the issues that concerned the
Supreme Court in Carpenter and to the types of privacy issues that
may concern the Court in the future. The Court’s comparison of
CSLI to outdated technology also demonstrates the flaws of a
haphazard approach to determining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections: comparing recent technology to that in use forty or fifty
years ago is an inherently confounding exercise.63

54

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
56
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
57
Id. at 442–43.
58
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
59
Id. at 744–45.
60
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
61
Id. at 412.
62
Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
63
See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54.
55
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A. Katz v. United States Establishes Expectations of Privacy
Standard
Although this Recent Development focuses on the third-party
doctrine aspects of the Carpenter decision, Katz figured so
prominently in the Court’s opinion that some discussion is
necessary. Katz recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects an
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy and is not strictly
property-based.64 Hence, the Carpenter court had to determine first
whether Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
general movements,65 and second, whether this expectation was
precluded because Carpenter allowed a third-party business to
collect and retain his location information.66
At issue in Katz was the FBI’s warrantless attachment of a
listening and recording device to the exterior of a phone booth used
by the defendant to transfer illegal gambling information.67 Because
the device was attached to the exterior of the phone booth, the
government argued no search had occurred under the Fourth
Amendment.68 This argument hinged on the traditional approach
that considered physical intrusion necessary to trigger Fourth
Amendment protection.69 In rejecting this argument, the Court
decoupled physical intrusion and searches requiring a warrant:
“once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people –
and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures,
it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.”70 Because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,”71 the Court looked to see whether Katz’s expectations when
using the phone booth rendered his conversation protected, and
64

See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
65
See id. at 2215 (citation omitted).
66
See id. at 2216 (citing Smith v. United States, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979);
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
67
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
68
Id. at 352–53.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 353.
71
Id. at 351.
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concluded that he acted within the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection.72 Justice Harlan’s concurrence reasoned that to establish
Fourth Amendment protection under this new “people, not places”
inquiry, the defendant must have a subjective expectation of privacy
and “the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”73 Justice Harlan’s formulation was
quickly adopted as the test for determining the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection post-Katz, and remains so today.74 However,
scholars have criticized Katz for beginning an interpretive regime
that lacks clarity and encourages idiosyncratic judicial
interpretations.75 The third-party doctrine represents a flaw in the
Katz interpretive system, serving as a somewhat arbitrary limitation
on what an individual’s “reasonable expectations of privacy” may
be.76
B. United States v. Miller Establishes the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine, which allows law enforcement to
access business records without a warrant, was established in
Miller.77 During an investigation of Miller’s illegal distillery, law
enforcement subpoenaed Miller’s financial records from two
banks.78 Investigators viewed microfilm copies of Miller’s account
and received copies of a deposit slip and checks from one bank, and
72

Id. at 352 (“No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it . . . is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.”) (footnotes omitted).
73
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74
Luke M. Milligan, The Real Rules of “Search” Interpretations, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 18 (2012).
75
See id. at 23–28 (describing scholarly criticism of the Katz approach).
76
See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1403 (2004) (“The conclusion that Miller, Smith, and like
cases foreclose any claim of an expectation of privacy in communications held by
a service provider fails to acknowledge . . . the doctrinal and normative
underpinnings of those decisions. A broad reading of Miller and Smith is also
fundamentally inconsistent with Katz.”).
77
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“This third-party
doctrine largely traces its roots to Miller.”).
78
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
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viewed microfilm copies and received copies of checks, deposit
slips, financial statements, and monthly statements from the second
bank.79 Evaluating Miller’s claim that accessing the documents
constituted an unreasonable search, the Court held that the banking
records were neither his “private papers,”80 nor were they protected
under Katz.81
In declining to extend Katz to protect Miller’s banking records,
the Supreme Court cited the Katz’s assertion that public information
falls outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.82 The Court
appeared likely to take a subjective approach when it explained that
“[w]e must examine the nature of the particular documents sought
to be protected in order to determine whether there is a legitimate
‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”83 The Court
then reasoned that when Miller voluntarily disclosed the information
contained in his bank records to a business, he assumed the risk that
the business would disclose this information to the government.84
After finding no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
Miller’s banking records, the Court’s opinion denied protection for
business records generally, stating:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 85

This unnecessarily restrictive approach to Katz fails to recognize
both the varying degrees of sensitive information contained in
business records and the varying degrees of trust a consumer may

79

Id. at 438.
Id. at 440–41 (finding that defendant did not have a property interest in the
records because they belonged to, and were controlled by, the banks).
81
Id. at 442–43.
82
Id. at 442 (“But in Katz the Court also stressed that ‘[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.’”) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
83
Id. (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)).
84
Id. at 442–43.
85
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
80

DEC. 2018]

Carpenter v. United States: A New Era?

15

have in different businesses.86 Accordingly, the third-party doctrine
as established in Miller serves as a categorical limitation on Katz, as
individuals are considered to lack any reasonable expectation of
privacy in business records held by third parties, even when those
records contain sensitive personal data.87
C. Smith v. Maryland Affirms the Third-Party Doctrine
Smith involved a pen register, installed by a telephone company
at the request of the police, to monitor outgoing calls from the
defendant’s telephone.88 A pen register is a device that collects and
stores the telephone numbers a customer dials, and operates from
equipment located at the telephone company’s offices.89 A pen
register therefore does not represent a property-based intrusion, and
does not acquire the content of the telephone conversation that
occurs after it records the dialed telephone number.90 By recording
the telephone numbers of Smith’s outgoing calls, the pen register
showed that Smith, who was suspected of stalking, had dialed the
victim’s number from his home telephone.91
The Court used the two-part test from Katz to evaluate Smith’s
claim that the pen register constituted a search requiring a warrant.92
The Court first explained that Smith lacked any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, since the fact
that phone companies collect and store this information was
86

See Bellia, supra note 76, at 1402 (“Read broadly, Miller suggests that the
mere fact that documents are conveyed to a third party, without regard to the type
of documents at issue or the purpose for which the documents were provided,
eliminates any expectation of privacy.”).
87
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528–
29 (2006) (citing Miller and Smith as the leading third-party doctrine cases while
noting that the third-party doctrine excludes significant amounts of information
from Fourth Amendment protection in the digital age).
88
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
89
Id. at 741.
90
Id. (“Yet a pen register differs significantly from the listening device
employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications.”); see also Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54 (explaining the
protected content versus unprotected non-content distinction while arguing that
this distinction is rendered irrelevant by modern technology).
91
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
92
Id. at 740–41.
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considered common knowledge.93 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court attributed to all telephone users the knowledge that dialed
telephone numbers are sent through the telephone company’s
equipment and recorded for billing purposes.94 After making this
somewhat unconvincing analysis, the Court argued that “[a]lthough
most people may be oblivious to a pen register’s esoteric functions,
they presumably have some awareness of one common use: to aid
in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene calls.”95
Thus, the Court’s assertion that any consumer knows telephone
companies receive and store dialed telephone numbers served to
prevent a reasonable expectation of privacy from forming, despite
the fact that Smith made the calls from his home telephone.96
Second, the Court reasoned that even if Smith had a subjective
expectation that the numbers he dialed would remain private, this
expectation was not “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable,’”97 because “[t]his Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”98 Under the Court’s logic,
voluntary activities that expose user information to third-party
businesses create an assumed risk that this information will be
passed along to law enforcement.99 Smith, then, solidified Miller’s
assertion that Katz does not extend its protections to third-party
business records as a class.
D. United States v. Jones Questions the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine as described in the 1970s by Miller and
Smith has received scholarly criticism due to the explosion of
personal technology, as the volume and content of data generated by

93

See id. at 742–43.
See id. at 742.
95
Id. (citations omitted).
96
Id. at 743 (“The fact that [Smith] dialed the number on his home phone rather
than on some other phone could make no conceivable difference, nor could any
subscriber rationally think it would.”).
97
Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
98
Id. at 743–44 (citations omitted).
99
See id. at 744–45.
94

DEC. 2018]

Carpenter v. United States: A New Era?

17

users and held by businesses has expanded exponentially.100 United
States v. Jones served as the precursor to Carpenter’s limitation of
the third-party doctrine both by leaving open the possibility of a
right to privacy in one’s general movements,101 and by Justice
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, which questioned the continued
applicability of the third-party doctrine in the digital age.102
At issue in Jones was law enforcement’s attachment of a GPS
tracker to a vehicle used by Jones and registered to his wife. 103
Although law enforcement obtained a warrant to place the device on
the vehicle, it was installed after the warrant expired and outside of
the jurisdiction where the warrant was issued.104 The GPS showed
the location of Jones’ vehicle from within 50 to 100 feet, and relayed
more than 2,000 pages of data over a one-month period.105 The
majority concluded that law enforcement had violated Jones’ Fourth
Amendment protections by committing a physical trespass on his
vehicle.106 In doing so, the majority relied on the older, propertybased standard of Fourth Amendment protection.107 However, the
majority noted the possibility that “achieving the same result
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an

100

See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (“It may be that
achieving the same result [surveilling Jones for four weeks] through electronic
means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”).
102
Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider
the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal about themselves to third parties
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”) (citations omitted).
103
See id. at 402–03 (majority opinion).
104
See id.
105
Id. at 403.
106
Id. at 404 (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.”); see also id. at 410 (“By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers
encroached on a protected area.”).
107
See Milligan, supra note 74, at 23 (explaining that Jones expanded the
importance of property in determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred by making property intrusions a “sufficient condition” for a search).
101
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unconstitutional invasion of privacy,”108 but deferred answering that
question.109
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provided a more feasible
framework for protecting information generated by personal devices
that does not hinge on physical intrusion while also calling into
question the continued use of the third-party doctrine.110 Justice
Sotomayor began by noting that “[t]he Government usurped Jones’
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby
invading privacy interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled
to, Fourth Amendment protection.”111 Although the appropriation of
Jones’ property was conducted through physically attaching a GPS
device, Justice Sotomayor explained that focusing on physical
intrusion is increasingly irrelevant due to tracking capabilities
embedded in consumer devices.112
Justice Sotomayor then noted the uniquely sensitive information
that precise GPS monitoring may reveal, as GPS data creates a
“comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.”113 The cost efficiency and
potential secrecy of GPS monitoring are additional causes for
concern,114 as is the chilling effect such surveillance may have, since
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”115 The concerns arising
from GPS surveillance led Justice Sotomayor to argue that there
exists a “reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of

108

Jones, 565 U.S. at 412.
Id.
110
Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
111
Id. at 413–14 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12
(1961)).
112
Id. at 415 (“With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of
duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or ownerinstalled vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”) (citing United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
113
Id. (citation omitted).
114
See id. at 415–16 (citation omitted).
115
See id. at 416.
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one’s public movements.”116 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence,
therefore, emphasized that the government should not be permitted
to easily collect aggregated data that reveals sensitive personal
characteristics and beliefs.117
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence concluded by questioning the
continued relevance of the third-party doctrine in the digital age,
given the broad scope of information individuals reveal to third
parties “in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”118 The
information these “mundane tasks” place at risk of disclosure
includes telephone numbers, websites, e-mail addresses, and items
purchased online.119 Justice Sotomayor also noted that societal
expectations “can attain constitutionally protected status only if our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed . . . is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.”120 Thus, under Justice Sotomayor’s
framework, the government may not coopt personal technology to
replace traditional surveillance methods simply because thirdparties have access to this sensitive, aggregated information.
IV. CARPENTER OPINION
Based on the sensitivity of aggregated location data that CSLI
discloses,121 and the inability to disable the collection of CSLI when
using a cell phone,122 the Carpenter majority held that law
enforcement conducted a Fourth Amendment search requiring a
warrant when officers accessed CSLI data revealing Carpenter’s
historic location information.123 Although the majority’s decision to
not extend the third-party doctrine represents a major step forward
for data privacy, the majority is unclear about the scope of the third116

Id.
See id.
118
Id. at 417.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 418 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
121
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018).
122
See id. at 2223.
123
Id. at 2212, 2220.
117
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party doctrine after Carpenter and provides little guidance about
how to approach new technology in the future.124
A. The Majority Opinion Has Potential for Predictable
Protections, but Risks a Haphazard Approach
In 2011, law enforcement officers accessed CSLI records from
Carpenter’s mobile carriers after obtaining court orders under the
Stored Communications Act,125 which allows law enforcement to
access telecommunications records by showing “‘reasonable
grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation.’”126 This is a lower standard
than that required to obtain a warrant, which requires “probable
cause.”127 Consequently, although law enforcement was required to
obtain a court’s approval to access Carpenter’s CSLI, the statutory
standard of proof was easier to meet than that required to obtain a
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.128 Officers obtained
129 days’ worth of CSLI from Carpenter’s two mobile carriers,
totaling 12,898 location points.129 This information was used at trial
to place Carpenter near four of the robberies for which he was
charged and convicted.130 The CSLI was mentioned in the
prosecutor’s closing argument, and Carpenter received a prison
sentence of over one hundred years.131
In holding that law enforcement improperly used CSLI to
convict Carpenter,132 the majority opinion relied on two separate, but
related, lines of cases. In the first line of cases, the Court discussed
the notion that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
See id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court fails ‘to provide clear
guidance to law enforcement’ and courts on key issues raised by its
reinterpretation of Miller and Smith.”) (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,
2491 (2014))).
125
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018).
126
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018)).
127
See id.
128
See id.
129
See id. at 2212–13.
130
See id.
131
See id. at 2213.
132
Id. at 2220 (“The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
124
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in their locations, relying largely on Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice
Alito’s concurrences from Jones.133 For the second line of cases, the
Court considered whether the third-party doctrine precluded
Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregated
location information, since this data was readily available to
Carpenter’s wireless carriers.134 For both issues, the Court concluded
that, “[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance
technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless
carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured
through CSLI.”135 Although the majority exempted CSLI from the
third-party doctrine,136 representing a significant step forward for
consumer privacy rights, the opinion is unclear about how, or
whether, to extend Fourth Amendment protection to other
technologies that reveal detailed personal information.
A thorough analysis of the language the majority used to
describe CSLI provides some clues as to the source of the perceived
differences between CSLI and other types of third-party business
records, such as those at issue in Miller and Smith. The majority
described CSLI as: “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled”;137 a “qualitatively different category”138 than bank
records and telephone numbers;139 “conveying . . . a detailed and
comprehensive record of the person’s movements”;140 “remarkably
easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative
tools”;141 a form of “tireless and absolute surveillance”;142 “a detailed
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every
moment, over several years”;143 “not truly ‘shared’ as one normally
133

See id. at 2215.
See id. at 2216.
135
Id. at 2217.
136
See id. (“We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel
circumstances.”).
137
Id. at 2216.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 2217.
141
Id. at 2218.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 2220.
134
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understands the term”;144 and “an entirely different species of
business record”145 before concluding that “the deeply revealing
nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the
inescapable and automatic nature of its collection”146 render CSLI
outside the scope of the third-party doctrine.147 Although the Court
used this collection of epithets to describe CSLI, it is unclear
whether a different technology must meet all of these descriptions
in order to be protected. Is this a list of necessary conditions that
must be met before data from a different technology receives Fourth
Amendment protection? Or is some minimum amount of these
attributes sufficient to grant protection to non-CSLI data? By not
answering these questions, the Court risks implementing a scattered
approach to extending Fourth Amendment protections to new
technologies.
The majority appeared to use a balancing test (without calling it
such)148 to determine that, because individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding their historical location
information, and because CSLI collects this information
automatically from a ubiquitous device, CSLI is therefore protected
from warrantless search.149 The majority then declined to consider
any broader application than historical CSLI, leaving unclear how,
or whether, to apply this logic to future technologies.150 Rather, the

144

Id.
Id. at 2222.
146
Id. at 2223.
147
See id.
148
Id. at 2231–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court appears, in my
respectful view, to read Miller and Smith to establish a balancing test. For each
‘qualitatively different category’ of information, the Court suggests, the privacy
interests at stake must be weighed against the fact that the information has been
disclosed to a third party.”) (citing majority opinion at 2216, 2219–20).
149
See id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (explaining that CSLI is not voluntarily
disclosed, in part due to the necessity of cell phones to modern life and the
inability to disable CSLI collection).
150
Id. (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on
matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ (a download of
information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a
particular interval). We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call
into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security
145
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Court restricted its holding to historical CSLI gathered over more
than six days.151 The Court did leave a small aperture to potentially
allow for future expansion of its holding by briefly stating, “[w]e
hold only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect
has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party,”152
but did not explain how to evaluate whether such a situation has
occurred. By declining to address future applications of its holding,
the Court risks implementing a haphazard approach to protecting
new technologies that will draw arbitrary distinctions between types
of data based on idiosyncratic analogies. Without a clear directive
on the status of the third-party doctrine after Carpenter, “the Court
fails ‘to provide clear guidance to law enforcement’ and courts on
key issues raised by its reinterpretation of Miller and Smith.”153
B. Justice Kennedy’s Dissent Presents the Risks and
Inconsistencies in the Majority’s Approach
Justice Kennedy’s dissent provided a defense of the third-party
doctrine154 and highlighted the risks and uncertainties of the
majority’s approach.155 Justice Kennedy argued that “Miller and
Smith set forth an important and necessary limitation on the Katz
framework. They rest upon the commonsense principle that the
absence of property law analogues can be dispositive of privacy
expectations.”156 In Justice Kennedy’s view, consumers have no
property interest in business records and, therefore, lack any
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.157 In justifying the
cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal
location information.”).
151
See id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“According to today’s majority
opinion, the Government can acquire a record of every credit card purchase and
phone call a person makes over months or years without upsetting a legitimate
expectation of privacy. But, in the Court’s view, the Government crosses a
constitutional line when it obtains a court’s approval to issue a subpoena for more
than six days of cell-site records . . . .”).
152
Id. at 2222 (majority opinion).
153
Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2491 (2014)).
154
See id. at 2226–28.
155
See id. at 2234.
156
Id. at 2228.
157
See id.
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third-party doctrine, Justice Kennedy focused on the lack of
consumer control over CSLI once it is collected by the service
provider and attributed knowledge of the commercial value and use
of this data to consumers.158 Similarly to the majority opinions in
Miller and Smith, this approach makes questionable assumptions
about the extent of consumer knowledge regarding data collection159
and refuses to recognize the varied expectations a consumer may
have when interacting with different businesses.160 Justice Kennedy
also argued that compelled disclosure of business records serves as
a useful and legitimate resource for law enforcement while affording
adequate protections to businesses, which release the data without
physical government intrusion and may object to this compelled
disclosure.161
After defending the third-party doctrine, Justice Kennedy
discussed the flaws inherent in the Court’s new, third-party
balancing test: “[f]or each ‘qualitatively different category’ of
information, the Court suggests, the privacy interests at stake must
be weighed against the fact that the information has been disclosed
to a third party . . . That is an untenable reading of Miller and
Smith.”162 In Justice Kennedy’s view, this approach arbitrarily
158

See id. at 2230 (“Because Carpenter lacks a requisite connection to the cellsite records, he also may not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in them.
He could expect that a third party—the cell service provider—could use the
information it collected, stored, and classified as its own for a variety of business
and commercial purposes.”).
159
See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54 (discussing the difficulty of knowing
what information a consumer may disclose by using technology in the digital age).
160
See Bellia, supra note 76, at 1403 (“There are at least four differences that
are relevant to an assessment of an expectation of privacy: (1) the type of
information at issue; (2) the individual’s purpose in placing information in the
hands of the third party; (3) the relevance of the substance of the information to
the third party’s activities; and (4) the limitations on the third party’s ability to
gain access to or use the substance of the information.”).
161
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228–29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Alan Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 112–122
(2018) (arguing that technology companies may serve as “surveillance
intermediaries” by resisting governmental efforts to access the consumer data they
hold).
162
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing majority
opinion at 2216, 2219–20).
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exempts CSLI from the third-party doctrine without convincingly
distinguishing it from other sensitive types of data that remain
subject to warrantless collection.163 Additionally, Justice Kennedy
critiqued the majority for considering the increasingly-precise
nature of CSLI in reaching its holding, arguing that “judicial
caution, prudent in most cases, is imperative in this one,”164 before
calling for deference to the statutory scheme in place.165 However,
Justice Kennedy’s argument in favor of judicial caution and
deference to legislative solutions largely ignored the historical
cooperation between the Court and Congress in extending Fourth
Amendment protections to new technologies.166 Indeed, it was the
Supreme Court that first protected the content of telephone calls in
Katz, with Congress later passing legislation to codify this
protection.167 The Court has historically possessed an important role
in applying the Fourth Amendment to emerging technologies and
should continue to do so, especially when the combined
jurisprudential and statutory approach becomes impracticable.168
Finally, Justice Kennedy provided a list of the challenges the
majority’s opinion poses for lower courts: the holding states that
163

Id. at 2232–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2233.
165
See id.
166
See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 12–19 (describing the interaction
between case law and statutory solutions in interpreting the Fourth Amendment);
see also Bloom and Clark, supra note 10, at 182 (“In fact, Congress and the Court
have often worked hand-in-hand to bring privacy protections to evolving
technologies.”).
167
See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 12–13; see also Bloom and Clark, supra
note 10, at 182 (“[A]fter the Court brought audio surveillance within the purview
of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, Congress passed the Wiretap Act, which
sought to regulate the government access to the contents of traditional phone calls.
The Act provided for comprehensive and detailed regulations and procedures for
wiretap orders.”).
168
See Bellovin et al., supra note 4, at 54 (describing the difficulties in applying
the third-party doctrine to modern technology); see also Bloom and Clark, supra
note 10, at 168 (“The late Justice Scalia in his 2001 majority opinion in Kyllo v.
[United States], a case involving thermal imaging, opined that ‘while the
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.’”) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
164
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CSLI is categorically different but “does not explain what makes
something a distinct category of information”;169 the holding “gives
courts and law enforcement officers no indication [of] how to
determine whether any particular category of information falls on
the financial-records side or the cell-site-records side of its newly
conceived constitutional line”;170 even after information is placed on
the CSLI side, “courts and law enforcement officers will have to
guess how much of that information can be requested before a
warrant is required”;171 and finally, the holding undermines widelyused subpoena practices.172 Justice Kennedy argued that this
amalgamation of uncertainties “will inhibit law enforcement and
‘keep defendants and judges guessing for years to come.’”173
Although returning to a strict application of the third-party doctrine
represents a worse alternative than the majority’s uncertain
approach, Justice Kennedy’s commentary speaks to the need for a
more predictable guide to applying the Carpenter majority’s
holding.
V. APPLYING CARPENTER IN FUTURE CASES: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS
When evaluating other types of data generated on personal
technology and held by third-party businesses, courts should read
Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to
provide a predictable system that protects sensitive consumer data
from warrantless searches. Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence
argued that, regardless of physical intrusion, the government should
not coopt personal property and turn it into a means of warrantless
surveillance.174 Although the technology at issue in Jones was GPS
169

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234.
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 2234–35 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014)).
174
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of
surveillance. With increasing regularity, the government will be capable of
duplicating the monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or ownerinstalled vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”) (citation
omitted).
170
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tracking, this logic is applicable to other forms of sensitive data.
Moreover, evaluating Fourth Amendment protections for the data
generated by newer technologies, such as IoT devices, is much
simpler, and more predictable, when reading Carpenter in
conjunction with Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence than when
reading Carpenter alone.
A. Courts Should Read Carpenter in Conjunction with Justice
Sotomayor’s Jones Concurrence
By highlighting the flaws of a haphazard approach, 175 Justice
Kennedy’s dissent pointed to the need for a predictable, stable
standard. Although Justice Kennedy would retain the third-party
doctrine,176 Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence provided a
predictable framework that would give consumers more protection
in the digital age without necessitating a return to the unnecessarily
constraining third-party doctrine.177 Reading Justice Sotomayor’s
Jones concurrence in conjunction with the Carpenter majority’s
holding provides a solution for avoiding the pitfalls Justice Kennedy
highlighted in his Carpenter dissent. To avoid a patchwork approach
to third-party data that depends on obscure “category-by-category
balancing,”178 or a return to the strict third-party regime of Miller
and Smith,179 courts should adopt an interpretive stance that
recognizes consumers have a reasonable expectation that the
government will not coopt personal technology in order to conduct
warrantless surveillance.
175

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2226–28 (providing a defense of the third-party doctrine).
177
Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
178
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Daniel J.
Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1528 (2010)
(“We should . . . start focusing on the hard practical issue of how best to regulate
government information gathering. The Fourth Amendment should cover
government information gathering comprehensively rather than haphazardly.”).
179
See Solove, supra note 178, at 1532 (“It is increasingly the case that much
of what we do, buy, and read generates records maintained by third parties.
Regulation and oversight should not turn on the happenstance of where such
records are located, and changing technology that increasingly locates them
outside people’s homes should not suddenly cause them to drop out of the
regulatory regime.”).
176

28

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 20: 1

“Personal technology” is an intentionally open-ended category
that includes familiar devices such as smart phones and laptops,
emerging technologies such as IoT devices, and the data-generating
programs that power these devices.180 In a world where consumer
devices interact with one another in complex ways to share and
aggregate data on their users,181 protecting one specific form of data
generated from one specific device does little to counter the rising
tide of surveillance.182 Rather than create an exhaustive list of
protected devices or forms of data, which would quickly become
outdated,183 this approach is intended to provide a flexible guiding
principle against warrantless surveillance through consumer devices
that will remain relevant as technology advances. Given the rapid
pace at which new technologies are introduced and integrated into

180

See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited Consumer Privacy
Protections Against the Layers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 483, 490–95 (2014) (describing the “layers” of data regarding
consumer behavior that accumulate from programs, such as web browsers and
applications, contained on personal electronic devices, and the manner in which
IoT devices add an additional layer to this system by extending internet
connectivity to physical objects).
181
See id. at 491–92 (“The increasing number of software applications
collecting data in Web 2.0 and social media is now augmented by physical devices
as part of the budding ‘Internet of Things.’ The layers of the broadband ecosystem
are expanding as users interact with the Internet in more ways than accessing static
websites and communicating over instant messaging. For example, retailers now
use Wi-Fi beacons to track shoppers in the physical world, and consumers use
their mobile devices to pay for real world goods. Information from such
interactions can be combined with other data from Web usage to create allencompassing marketing profiles of specific consumers.”).
182
See id. at 493 (“It should be noted that users may still transmit enough data
to paint a comprehensive picture of their lives regardless of whether they are part
of a singular company’s digital ecosystem or opt to use the hardware, software,
and connectivity platforms of wholly different entities.”).
183
See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 823 (“The drive for innovation, consumer
efficiency, and self-awareness has turned ordinary activity into valuable data.
Because of this valuable data, more and more ‘things’ are being created to collect
that information. The proliferation of smart objects brings with it the proliferation
of surveillance capabilities, a reality that statutory or constitutional law will soon
need to address.”).
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daily life,184 an unpredictable “category-by-category balancing”185
approach risks isolating Fourth Amendment protection to aging
technologies, while newer technologies that present greater risks of
surveillance remain unprotected.186
Justice Sotomayor outlined an approach that recognized the risk
of surveillance through personal technology, stating that “[t]he
Government usurped Jones’ property for the purpose of conducting
surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy interests long
afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment
protection.”187 Because Katz recognized that “the reach of the Fourth
Amendment does not ‘turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion,’”188 formulating the question in terms of coopting
personal technology into a means of surveillance avoids both the
traditional physical trespass approach from Jones189 and the
contorted balancing test from Carpenter.190 Justice Sotomayor
recommended that, rather than strictly adhering to the third-party
doctrine,191 courts should “ask whether people reasonably expect

184
See id. at 817–18 (describing the increased use and availability of IoT
devices).
185
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Solove, supra note 178, at 1528 (“We should . . . start
focusing on the hard practical issue of how best to regulate government
information gathering. The Fourth Amendment should cover government
information gathering comprehensively rather than haphazardly.”).
186
See Bloom and Clark, supra note 10, at 168 (“The late Justice Scalia in his
2001 majority opinion in Kyllo v. [United States], a case involving thermal
imaging, opined that ‘while the technology used in the present case was relatively
crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or in development.’”) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
36 (2001)).
187
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–14 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961)).
188
Id. at 414 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
189
Id. at 404, 410 (majority opinion).
190
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citing majority opinion at 2216, 2219–20).
191
Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally,
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
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that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”192 Because
this question focuses on the “attributes”193 of government
surveillance (data aggregation from connected items in personal
use),194 and the sensitive information such surveillance may
disclose,195 formulating the question in this manner provides a more
predictable and comprehensive means of evaluating other types of
data held by third parties. This approach lends itself well to a
predictable expansion of individual privacy protection.
Protecting data generated on personal devices from being
coopted into a means of government surveillance would be one way
to enact scholarly recommendations that “the Fourth Amendment
should provide protection whenever a problem of reasonable
significance can be identified with a particular form of government
information gathering.”196 Law enforcement’s ability to access the
vast amounts of data held by third-party businesses without a
warrant presents “a problem of reasonable significance”197 that
courts now have the opportunity to resolve by reading Carpenter
alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence. Protecting
personal technology from being coopted and turned into a means of
warrantless surveillance provides a broad, stable base for protecting
consumer privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a world where
“physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of
about themselves in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”) (citations
omitted).
192
Id. at 416.
193
Id. (“I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the
sum of one’s public movements.”).
194
See id. (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the government might
obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance
techniques.”) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 535 U.S. 27, 35, n.2 (2001)).
195
See generally Michael Gentithes, The End of Miller’s Time: How Sensitivity
Can Categorize Third-Party Data After Carpenter, 5 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3155644
(recommending that courts focus on the sensitivity of gathered data in determining
whether a search has occurred).
196
Solove, supra note 178, at 1514.
197
Id.
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surveillance.”198 This standard should be applied both to the realtime gathering of information at issue in Jones and the historical
data accessed in Carpenter.
As Justice Sotomayor noted, the government’s ability to conduct
large-scale surveillance through personal technology has high costs
for society: “[a]wareness that the government may be watching
chills associational and expressive freedoms. And the government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of
identity is susceptible to abuse.”199 Location data is not unique in
raising these concerns,200 as the Carpenter majority suggested.201
Rather, most activities on personal technology raise these concerns,
as third parties have access to uniquely sensitive data in enormous
quantities from a variety of uses.202 Consumers should not lose
Fourth Amendment protections for this aggregated data merely
because it is held by a business.203 By focusing on the means of
collecting data and protecting consumers from warrantless
government surveillance through their own personal technology,
courts would avoid the logical contortions inherent in the Carpenter
majority’s unstructured approach. This interpretive stance would
also assist in returning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the
comprehensive standard originally envisaged by Katz.204

198

Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Alito, J.,
concurring, 424–29).
199
Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
200
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2232 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the variety of business records that could match the
majority’s description of why CSLI is unique and deserves protection).
201
See id. at 2223 (majority opinion).
202
See Bagley & Brown, supra note 180, at 490–95.
203
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (listing the various
ways consumers disclose sensitive information in large amounts to third-party
businesses and arguing that consumers would object to warrantless government
access to this data).
204
See Milligan, supra note 74, at 23 (“This reliance on property law, along
with the Court’s ratification of old rules and its drift away from public
expectations of privacy, make clear that Katz failed in its promise to reorient
‘search’ doctrine along the lines of an objective and evolving privacy standard.”).
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B. Future Applications
Considering the plethora of sensitive personal data that is
increasingly generated by personal technology and held by
businesses demonstrates the advantages of reading Carpenter
alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence. This interpretive
stance provides more predictable protections for consumer data than
reading Carpenter alone. The hypothetical example in this section
discusses the protection of data generated from IoT devices, but
could also apply to less novel forms of data, such as that generated
on smartphone applications or laptops. Although IoT devices offer
consumers unparalleled conveniences, such as the ability to reorder
grocery items as they are depleted,205 they also present unparalleled
disclosure of formerly private data to third-party businesses.206
A hypothetical application of Carpenter when read alongside
Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence demonstrates the
effectiveness of an interpretive stance that looks at the means of data
acquisition and the sensitive personal information surveillance may
disclose.207 By preventing law enforcement from usurping data
generated from personal technology to conduct warrantless
surveillance, this standard protects data generated on IoT devices
from warrantless search. Consider a hypothetical investigation of an
individual who regularly uses an Alexa speaker device and an
Alexa-compatible smart microwave located in her home.208 Every
evening at 10:35, she instructs Alexa to play her favorite radio
station, while instructing the microwave to heat a cup of tea. Both
devices record their respective vocal commands, translate them into
action, and send the data to Amazon servers for storage. 209 Over
time, this data becomes a comprehensive record of this hypothetical
consumer’s evening routine, which is stored and maintained by
Amazon.210 If law enforcement later suspects this consumer of
205

See Zwerdling, supra note 1.
See Ferguson, supra note 43, at 807–08.
207
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing data
collection and aggregation while questioning the third-party doctrine); see also
Solove, supra note 178, at 1514.
208
See Bogost, supra note 3 (discussing the use of Alexa-compatible devices).
209
See id.
210
See Zwerdling, supra note 1.
206
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committing a crime during the time she typically instructs her Alexa
speaker to play music and her smart microwave to heat a cup of tea,
the data held by Amazon would reveal whether or not she was using
these devices on the night in question, and perhaps, whether or not
she was at home.211 This data could quickly undermine, or support,
any alibi this consumer presented, and law enforcement would be
eager to access this information, along with the data from any of the
consumer’s other “smart” devices.212
Reading Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones
concurrence would require law enforcement officers to obtain a
warrant before accessing this consumer’s data generated by Alexa
or other “smart” devices. Because this interpretive stance requires a
warrant before law enforcement may gather aggregated data
generated through personal technology,213 this consumer’s evening
routine as recorded by her Alexa-compatible devices would fall
squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s protection. The IoT
devices disclose this hypothetical consumer’s evening routine by
collecting and aggregating data from a connected consumer
device,214 thereby presenting the means-based surveillance
capability this interpretive stance is calculated to guard against.215
The data at issue in this scenario also implicates Justice Sotomayor’s
concerns about data collection that reveals sensitive information
about “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”216 This consumer’s Alexa devices could generate data
disclosing her choice of guests and could document the questions
and commands she gives the device.217 Thus, using a combined
211

See id.
See id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 43, at 819 (discussing the implications
of connected “smart” devices).
213
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (discussing surveillance through aggregated data).
214
See Bogost, supra note 3; see also Posadas, supra note 19, at 75–78
(describing IoT devices and the large amounts of data they generate).
215
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Solove,
supra note 178, at 1514 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment should provide protection
whenever a problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular
form of government information gathering.”).
216
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
217
See Zwerdling, supra note 1.
212
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interpretation of Carpenter and Justice Sotomayor’s Jones
concurrence that focuses on both the means of data collection and
the sensitive personal information this data could disclose protects
data generated on this consumer’s “smart” devices from warrantless
search.
Reading Carpenter alone, however, makes the outcome of this
hypothetical less clear. First, the requested data does not directly
provide aggregated location information: it can show whether this
consumer was at home, but does not provide “a detailed and
comprehensive record of the person’s movements.”218 Second, it is
unclear whether a court would consider verbal commands to be a
“qualitatively different category”219 than bank records and telephone
numbers.220 The court might consider the actual “content” of the
command to be protected, but allow warrantless access to data
indicating when, and whether, a command was made.221 Finally, a
court could conclude that, unlike CSLI, the collection of data from
Alexa devices is not “inescapable and automatic,”222 since the
devices record data generated from commands. Therefore, a court
might conclude, without the consumer’s instruction to heat a cup of
tea, the “smart” microwave would have no data to record.223
218

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
Id. at 2216–17.
220
Id.
221
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (distinguishing a pen
register from listening to a protected telephone conversation because the pen
register does not acquire the content of the call); see also Bellovin et al., supra
note 4, at 54 (“New technologies challenge many of the basic assumptions
underlying such principles as the third-party doctrine. Specifically, there may be
no way for a user to know or even discover what kind of information she shares
with third parties, many of whom are invisible to her. Similarly, traditional models
of what constitutes content and what might be considered mere transactional, noncontent information often yield nonsensical, indeterminate, or unsatisfying results
when applied to modern technologies.”).
222
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
223
However, voice-activated devices may record and transmit background
conversations that are not intended to be commands, drawing into question
whether data from these devices is voluntarily disclosed. See Niraj Chokshi, Is
Alexa Listening? Amazon Echo Sent Out Recording of Couple’s Conversation,
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/
amazon-alexa-conversation-shared-echo.html.
219
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On the other hand, a court might decide to extend protection to
Alexa-generated data by relying on a different set of epithets the
Carpenter Court used to describe CSLI. For example, a court could
decide that data from an Alexa-compatible device is “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,”224 since it is generated by
a commonly-used device that records and transmits verbal cues.
Additionally, data generated from an Alexa-compatible device fits
the Carpenter Court’s description of CSLI as “remarkably easy,
cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools,”225
and could be considered a form of “tireless and absolute
surveillance.”226
By failing to articulate a clear standard for applying its decision
to future technologies, the Carpenter Court risks implementing a
system that protects data generated from personal devices
haphazardly.227 Without a guiding interpretive structure, protection
of other forms of data held by third-party businesses could hinge on
which of the Carpenter majority’s various descriptions of CSLI a
lower court chooses to use. Alternatively, lower courts could find
that no other forms of data rise to this level of sensitivity, rendering
CSLI an anomalous exception to the third-party doctrine. However,
the Carpenter majority’s lack of clarity also presents an opportunity
to extend Fourth Amendment protection to other forms of
aggregated data generated by personal technology and held by third
parties. Courts should look to the Carpenter decision as a means to
extend Fourth Amendment protections to other forms of data, while
reading Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence to provide structure
and breadth to this approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Carpenter represents a significant step forward for
individual privacy rights by protecting historical CSLI from
224

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct at 2216.
Id. at 2218.
226
Id.; see also Chokshi, supra note 223.
227
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
fails ‘to provide clear guidance to law enforcement’ and courts on key issues
raised by its reinterpretation of Miller and Smith.”) (citing Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014)).
225
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warrantless search, the opinion risks becoming a mere caveat to the
third-party doctrine if interpreted narrowly. Additionally, the
majority’s haphazard approach risks implementing a system that
requires “qualitatively different”228 types of third-party records
before Fourth Amendment protections apply, without providing
guidelines to assist courts in determining which records satisfy this
requirement. Rather than following this narrow, contorted approach,
courts should read Carpenter alongside Justice Sotomayor’s Jones
concurrence, thereby protecting data generated from personal
devices in order to provide a broad, stable foundation for preventing
other equally concerning forms of government surveillance. CSLI,
sensitive as it may be, should not be the only category of aggregated
consumer information held by third-party businesses that is
protected after Carpenter.

228

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17.

